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Job Creation versus Cash Transfers in Kenya
After a long period of economic regression, the Kenyan
economy has recently started to recover, raising hopes for
reducing poverty. Buoyed by this recovery, the Economic
Recovery Strategy of the Kenyan Government has the ambitious
goal of creating 500,000 jobs per year. But if these jobs are going
to be reasonably productive, Kenya will need to grow more
rapidly than 6 per cent per year.
However, there is no guarantee that poor households will benefit
from such projected growth or the jobs that it generates. So, targeted
programmes will continue to play an essential role in the medium
term in reducing poverty. This One Pager offers an initial assessment
of the effectiveness of two such programmes—a job-creation
programme and a cash-transfer programme based on child grants.1
Targeted cash transfers are popular nowadays among
governments and donor agencies. Often, they are based on the
number of school-age children in a household and conditional on
school attendance and health check-ups. Using data from Kenya’s
1998/99 Labour Force Survey (LFS), we simulate such a transfer to
all children aged 6 to 14 years in poor households. The cost is a
mere four per cent of total household income. The result is a six
percentage point fall in the incidence of poverty and an eight
percentage point reduction in the depth of poverty.
What would be the impact of a job programme that is similarly
financed? To answer this question, we simulate the effect of wages
paid by such a programme to a group that includes both: 1) all
unemployed workers from poor households and 2) all workers
from such households whose labour earnings were lower than the
level of wages paid by the programme. The wage level of such a
programme is critical. We set the wage roughly equivalent to the
poverty lines for rural and urban areas—specifically, the minimum
wage of unskilled workers in rural agriculture and that of unskilled
workers in all urban sectors other than Nairobi.
The overall percentage point decreases across the country in the
incidence and depth of poverty are similar for the cash-transfer
and job programmes. However, since the number of school-age
children per household is larger in rural areas, the cash-transfer
programme has a stronger impact there (providing a 37 per cent
increase in household income—see Figure). However, in urban
areas, where poor workers are relatively worse-off, the job
programme has a stronger impact (boosting household income
by 78 per cent).
An additional important finding is that the lower the capacity of a
household to secure gainful employment, the larger the benefit of
the job creation programme. The benefits of the job programme
in urban areas are most pronounced for the poorest 10 per cent
of households.
Both child-transfer and job programmes have a progressive regional
impact, i.e., the increase in income is larger, the poorer the district.
But the job programme tends to be more beneficial for the poorest
households. In nine of the ten poorest urban districts, the job
programme out-performs the child-transfer programme; and even in
five of the ten poorest rural districts, the job programme is superior.
The basic reason is that the job programme enables the poorest
households to begin generating income.
Both child-transfer and job programmes help enhance the
development of human capabilities, especially of children. The
evidence suggests that increasing the income of poor households
suffices—independently of conditionalities—to improve education
and health. This assumes, of course, that there is an adequate supply
of such services. But a job programme is likely to have a stronger
multiplier impact than child grants by helping to build economic and
social infrastructure. If such a programme builds health clinics and
schools, for instance, it can help boost the supply of social services.
If enhancing the current productive capabilities of poor workers
is an important objective, then a job programme is also likely to
be better. Such a programme provides these workers with more
productive employment and develops skills. One objection often
lodged against job programmes is that they could distort labour
markets, such as by raising minimum wages. However, under
Kenya’s low-wage, labour-surplus conditions, policymakers
should be more concerned with creating economic dynamism
than worrying about such imaginary impacts, which are more
applicable to developed economies.
Note:
1. See Eduardo Zepeda (2007). ‘Addressing the Employment-Poverty Nexus in Kenya’,
IPC Working Paper, forthcoming.
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